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RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND EVOLUTION: PAUL
TILLICH’S FOURTH WAY
by Richard Grigg
Abstract. In his book God After Darwin John Haught provides a
useful categorization of theological approaches to evolution: some
theologians actively oppose Darwinian evolution, another group maintains
that science and religion have nothing to say to one another,
and a third seeks to engage evolution. Haught wishes to pursue the
third way. But many theological attempts to talk about divine action
in the world, including divine involvement in the process of evolution,
run afoul of the scientific principle of the conservation of matterenergy. Haught’s reliance on the now-familiar notion that
information can have causal efficacy does not in fact escape this difficulty.
I suggest a fourth approach, represented by a constructive reading
of Paul Tillich’s theology. The central argument is that Tillich
offers a way of taking Darwinian evolution up into one’s ultimate
concern without claiming that God has any causal relation to evolution.
God provides no historical telos for evolution, but rather a
“depth teleology” that springs from the manner in which God, as the
depth of the structure of finite being, is the object of Christian faith.
Keywords: conservation of energy; depth teleology; John Haught;
theology and evolution; Paul Tillich.

Those who embrace the Christian faith have ever wanted to speak about
their God as a God who acts. The Christian God acts primordially in the
creation of the universe, and, rather than subsequently abandoning creation,
as the Deist’s God was wont to do, the Christian God continues to
act within and upon creation. God’s continuous action includes preservation,
providential guidance, and perhaps also discrete and spectacular acts
of intervention. It is the second of these, God’s providential guidance of
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God’s creation, that concerns us here, because it is that dimension of divine
action that connects most readily with our focus, the evolution of
living things on the earth. In the pages that follow, John Haught’s God
After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution (2000) is my starting point. But
while Haught’s provocative reflections serve as something of a center of
gravity for my own reflections here, I ultimately suggest that a particular
reading of Paul Tillich’s theology (an admittedly rather radical one) will
serve us better in confronting some of the difficult technical problems that
face us in talking about divine action vis-à-vis biological evolution.
The moment that we begin to consider claims of divine action in the
world, including divine guidance of evolution, we face a particularly stern
scientific challenge: all talk of God acting within the physical universe
appears to run afoul of the law of the conservation of mass-energy. That
law tells us that in a closed system energy can change form but cannot be
created or destroyed; if one inventories the energy in such a system on
Monday, one must come up with the very same amount of energy when
one checks the system again on Friday.
How, then, can God ever act within creation? Any such action should
register as an illicit addition of energy from outside the closed system of
the universe. The Christian thinker will no doubt be tempted to fall back

upon the venerable Thomistic notion of primary and secondary causality:
God acts through the natural causal channels of the world that God has
created. Unfortunately, this will not do as a response to the challenge of
the conservation law. If the assertion that God acts through secondary
causes is to be more than merely a poetic flourish, if it is meant to suggest
that there really is a God who makes things happen in the physical universe
that would not have happened without divine action, then God must
add something to or change the direction of the natural, or secondary,
causal processes of the world. But that takes us right back to our problem:
any such addition or tampering violates the law of conservation.
What should the Christian thinker who desires to see some role for God
in the process do when confronted with the Darwinian evolution of all
living things on the earth? Haught’s categories of opposition, separatism,
and engagement are certainly helpful.1 Some theologians will choose the
way of opposition—creationist thinkers fit here, for example—but simple
opposition to the scientific notion of evolution is hopelessly benighted. As
Pope John Paul II has reminded his flock, evolution is more than just a
hypothesis; the evidence to support it is overwhelming.
Those who have not bothered to follow the latest efforts of anti-Darwinian
Christians to make their case are to be congratulated for their good
judgment. Just to put everything on the table, however, let it be stated
that those efforts are summed up in what is being called intelligent-design
(ID) theory, which has been with us only since around 1990. Its proponents
do attempt some new maneuvers, such as attacking evolutionary
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theory on the molecular level and drawing on information theory. But
careful thinkers who have taken the time to reply have had no difficulty in
showing the tangle of confusions that characterizes ID thinking (see Edis
2001; Pennock 2001; Roche 2001). To take up residence in the oppositionist
camp is simply to remove oneself from all serious discussion of the
nature of our world.
What of the separatist camp? That must surely be a more respectable
option; after all, both scientist Stephen Jay Gould (1999) and the Tillich
of Dynamics of Faith (1957) appear to fit there. Tillich tells us in that book
that “scientific truth and the truth of faith do not belong to the same
dimension of meaning. Science has no right and no power to interfere
with faith and faith has no power to interfere with science. One dimension
of meaning is not able to interfere with another dimension” (p. 81).
The separatist position, however, rests upon a confusion. Suppose that
when I am in a state of despair I pray to God and then find my mindset
transformed. Desperation is replaced by optimism and torpor by renewed
vigor. The separatist will most likely describe what happened by saying
that God has acted to give me strength but that only the eyes of faith can
see that it was in fact the work of God. Science will find nothing unusual
in the transformation, because science by its nature is confined to a dimension
of reality wholly separate from the transcendent reality of God and
God’s action. Here is the confusion, though: while one may claim that
only faith is privy to the fact that it was God who acted, the result of that
action is publicly observable, at least in principle, even when we are talking
about something as apparently private as a change in my mental state. For
my mood to change, my brain chemistry must change: dopamine will flow,

or serotonin levels will rise, or electrical activity will increase—whatever
the details, the change will be more than evident under scientific scrutiny.
And any such change will entail expenditure of energy. If this energy is
introduced by God, however far back in some perhaps exceedingly long
causal chain, if it is not simply part of a series of events that was going to
occur in any case, with or without God, the conservation law is violated.
In short, the separatist stance does not succeed in removing all elements of
a theological claim from scientific investigation, and the crucial fact of the
matter is that the elements of the claim left in plain view are sufficient for
the scientist to detect a violation of the conservation of energy.
Haught’s third way appears much more promising, not to mention more
interesting, than either the way of opposition or the way of separation.
This is the way of engagement: theology is not wholly separate from science,
but neither does it connect with science simply by rejecting scientific
claims. Rather, theological claims can constructively mesh with, and thus
do real work with, scientific facts and theories.
But let us not forget the specific problem in view, viz., how to speak
meaningfully of divine action in the world without violating the law of the
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conservation of energy. How does the way of engagement make claims of
divine action without needing to smuggle extra energy into a physical system?
Haught, along with a number of other eminent commentators on
science and theology, turns to the notion of nonenergetic information.
Let us use an example of billiard balls to see how this might work. Suppose
that I rack up the fifteen balls at one end of the table, arranging them in
the familiar triangular pattern. Taking aim with my cue from the other
end of the table, I fire the cue ball into that triangular grouping, sending
the fifteen balls careening off on different paths. The cue ball and the
other balls are interacting with one another via mechanical causality, via
what, from the time of Aristotle, has been called efficient causality. The
kinetic energy that I have imparted to the cue ball expends itself in such a
way as to move the other balls (and to generate a negligible amount of
heat). All of the energy that is used here can be fully accounted for, and is
thoroughly explicable, by looking back to the motion of the cue ball, and
from there back to the motion of my cue, and so on.
But we ought to notice something else about this scenario. The original
triangular pattern of the balls must have had an effect. That arrangement
helped determine the trajectories that the fifteen balls followed after having
been set in motion by the cue ball. Yet—and this is crucial—the causal
efficacy of this initial pattern surely cannot be reduced to the kinetic activity
of the cue ball, nor to the individual characteristics of the fifteen balls
that constitute the pattern, nor to the causal interactions between those
balls, nor to any combination of these factors. The pattern appears to have
a causal efficacy of its own; it cannot be reduced to the efficient causality
operating between the individual balls. It thus appears that this causal
efficacy is not a function of expending energy. It is instead simply a function
of the information represented by the arrangement of the balls.
It certainly seems that we have come upon causal efficacy without expenditure
of energy, and this is important news for the theologian. For it
opens the possibility that God can exercise causal efficacy in the world,
that God can act within the world, by imparting information rather than

energy to the world. Divine action can thus be squared with the law of the
conservation of energy, and we can find a meaningful way to talk about
God guiding the evolutionary process. Haught’s particular way of tapping
in here is to claim that God can act by luring events into the future. Drawing
on thinkers such as Alfred North Whitehead and Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin, Haught argues that God is ever a God of the novel, of what can
be, and God acts within the evolutionary process by introducing genuinely
new possibilities that make evolution in the fullest sense possible.
But, alas, there is a serious problem here that I have glossed over. The
problem becomes evident when we return to our example. While the initial
arrangement of the billiard balls on the table exercises causal efficacy
without expending energy, there is a very definite expenditure of energy in
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the act of arranging the balls. I expended energy in racking up the balls in
that particular pattern. In other words, while no energy use is detectable
when we look at the pattern as an accomplished fact, that is not a broad
enough view of the phenomenon. When we widen our inquiry and look
at the phenomenon as a whole, it is quite evident that the causal efficacy of
the initial triangular arrangement of the balls necessarily draws upon my
expenditure of energy in the act of arranging them. In the end, the manner
in which pattern-as-information exercises causal power does not after
all provide a way for God to act in the world without violating the law of
the conservation of energy.
Even Arthur Peacocke, probably the best known advocate of the
nonenergetic, information-as-causality approach, a form of top-down causality,
seems to admit to this problem:
. . . in the world we observe through the sciences, we know of no transfer of information
without some exchange of matter and/or energy, however minimal. So to
speak of God as “informing” the world-as-a-whole without such inputs of matter/
energy . . . is but to accept the ultimate, ontological gap between the nature of
God’s own being and that of the created world. (Peacocke 1995, 286)

Translation: transfer of information always involves expenditure of energy.
Hence, the information-as-causality model of God’s action in the world
does not really help us to escape violation of the conservation law.
But perhaps my billiard-ball example is not quite right. One might
argue that, while it does provide a good picture of the unique properties
and effects of pattern on a series of events, the analogy breaks down when
I describe my expending energy in racking up the balls in a particular
pattern; for Haught suggests that God patterns evolution not by crudely
reaching into physical systems and arranging them but, in the fashion described
in Whitehead’s panpsychism, that God lures entities into particular
patterns. This response still does not allow us to escape our dilemma. For
however one understands the metaphysics of God’s luring creation, if the
claim at issue is the strong one that it is God’s lure that resulted in a particular
pattern of physical entities and that those entities would have been
arranged in another pattern without God’s lure, then it must be said that
God has altered the configuration of a physical system—and to alter the
configuration of a physical system requires the expenditure of energy. If
the claim is a weak one, namely, that God simply presents to entities (or to
Whiteheadian “actual occasions”) certain logical and physical possibilities
that the entities may or may not actualize, then the claim does not seem

sufficiently strong for a doctrine of God’s providential guidance of the
evolutionary process.
Hence, the need for a fourth way to think about the relationship between
science and theology, a way distinguishable from the ways of opposition,
separation, and engagement. I suggest that we turn again to Tillich
948 Zygon
in order to find this fourth way. Tillich’s mature system suggests the possibility
of meshing science and theology not, as in the way of engagement,
by linking the tenets of technical or scientific reason with metaphysics (or
with Tillich’s own “ontological reason,” which has cognitive and aesthetic,
theoretical and practical dimensions) but rather by linking scientific reason
with ecstatic reason. Ecstatic reason, explains Tillich, is “reason grasped by
an ultimate concern” (1951–63, 1:53). With Tillich’s theology, Darwinian
evolution can be taken up into our ultimate concern, but not in the
form of a theory about how the God who is the object of Christian ultimate
concern causally influences the evolutionary process. Indeed, Tillich
cannot talk at all about God having a causal relation to evolution, however
subtle; for Tillich—good Kantian that he is, at least at some points in his
thought—designates causality as one of the categories of finite being and
thinking (1951–63, 1:192–98). As a category of finite being and thinking,
causality cannot apply to God as being-itself or to God’s relation to
the world.
How exactly does Tillich’s theological system, or at least a constructive
rereading of it, connect God and biological evolution? In its briefest form,
my thesis is this: God is not relevant at all to biological evolution taken in and
of itself, but evolution and God come into substantive contact via our own,
human quest for redemption. Now, Michael Drummy, in his insightful
study on Tillich and ecology, Being and Earth (2001), continually reminds
us of the dangers of the old Protestant anthropocentrism of grace, which
so focuses upon the individual soul’s direct relation to God, its absolute
relation to the Absolute, that it thoroughly disregards the world of nature.
I want to be clear at the outset that my proposal does involve a form of
anthropocentrism, and, given Drummy’s well-placed warning, I begin with
a brief apologetic for anthropocentrism, the upshot of which is that there
are better and worse anthropocentrisms. Every theological position operates
from some perspective. Furthermore, perspective is necessarily a function
of consciousness. Pre-sentient nature by definition does not possess
consciousness. Thus, there is no such thing as the perspective of the larger
world of nature. We are stuck simply with choices between different anthropocentric
perspectives on nature. Granted, there may be a divine perspective
on nonhuman nature and its value, but we have no direct access to
any divine perspective. Even an alleged revelation must be both received
and interpreted from a particular human perspective. It should be added
that if the God we have in mind is Tillich’s “transpersonal” God, it is not
clear that God even has a perspective. It is an anthropocentric perspective
on nature, then, or none at all.
An important distinction needs to be made: there are fecund and magnanimous
anthropocentric perspectives, on one hand, and petty and destructive
ones, on the other. I take Drummy’s warnings about traditional
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anthropocentrisms of grace to be about the latter kind, the kind that devalue

and cut us off from the world of nature. When I assert that God is to
be connected to evolution only through our own quest for redemption, I
am aiming for a magnanimous anthropocentrism.
I prepare the ground for my case by briefly reviewing some of the basic
elements of Tillich’s theology. Human being, as finite being, is constantly
threatened by nonbeing (finite being is simply being that is limited by
nonbeing)—a threat given to consciousness in the form of anxiety. Thus,
the religious quest is the quest for an ultimate concern that can enable the
self-affirmation of being in spite of the threat of nonbeing. The only legitimate
object of such a quest is God as being-itself, the depth of the
structure of finite being. Readers of the three volumes of Tillich’s Systematic
Theology will recall that the religious quest and the dynamics of ultimate
concern are complicated by distinguishing among “essential,”
“existential,” and “ambiguous” being. For the sake of brevity, I shall not
spell out these technical distinctions here. It is sufficient for our purposes
to know that all three forms of being require the self-affirmation of being
in spite of the threat of nonbeing. The particular form of being that we
shall have occasion to consider in a bit more detail later on is the one that
Tillich equates with “fallenness,” namely, existential being.2
Because Tillich, clearly influenced by Heidegger, proceeds phenomenologically
when describing the whole structure of finite being, not just the
structure of human being, it is unsurprising that he finds the basic polarity
of self and world in all instances of finite being, even if only analogically.
Says Tillich, even “selfhood or self-centeredness must be attributed in some
measure to all living beings and, in terms of analogy, to all individual Gestalten
even in the inorganic realm” (1951–63, 1:169). The whole natural
world participates, then, in the being of humanity. This is a formal result
of Tillich’s phenomenological derivation of the structure of being. But the
reverse is also true: human beings participate in the world of nature. Here
we look not to formal considerations derived from Tillich’s chosen ontological
method but to material considerations. Specifically, we should look
to Darwinian evolution, for nothing shows us so powerfully that we are
part of the larger physical world of nature than the facts of the evolution of
the species and the dynamics of natural selection. These facts tell us who
we are: we are one permutation of the laws and energetic interactions that
make up the universe. Thus, we can speak of a reciprocal participation of
nature in humanity and of humanity in nature: nature participates formally
and analogically in humanity insofar as our point of entry into the
being of nature can only be through human being as that being for whom
its own being is an issue; human beings participate materially in nature
insofar as we are the product of thoroughly natural forces. To be precise,
then, we can call this asymmetric reciprocal participation.
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Now, the powerful fashion in which Darwin—along with later physics,
biology, chemistry, and cosmology—spells out for us that we are inextricably
bound up with the whole of the natural world ought to affect our sense
of the religious quest, ought to shape that quest more directly than Tillich
explicitly allowed in his own writings. We look, says Tillich, to God as the
depth of being, as that which allows us to affirm our being in spite of the
threat of nonbeing. As already mentioned, the threat of nonbeing is given
to human consciousness in the form of anxiety, and a bold confrontation

with the facts of Darwinian evolution will have an impact, for example, on
our experience of what Tillich names the relative form of ontic anxiety—
that is, the anxiety of fate (see Tillich 1952). Evolution is a wholly contingent,
absolutely nonteleological process. Thinking through the facts of
evolution leads us to grasp what we might well designate as not the
“thrownness” of the individual but rather the “thrownness” of the human
species. And to face head-on the fact that we ourselves are thus a mere
accident of nature—albeit a “glorious accident,” in Gould’s felicitous
phrase3—is to encounter a most powerful form of the anxiety of fate.
The religious quest as informed by a grasp of the science of evolution,
then, is the quest for a source of courage that allows me meaningfully to
affirm my being in spite of the pure nonteleological contingency of my
origin. (One might note here, by the way, how ontic anxiety, the anxiety of
fate, fuses with what Tillich calls spiritual anxiety, the anxiety of emptiness
and meaninglessness.) Tillich’s God, however, is up to the task; his God
can provide the courage that I require. For while I can find no meaningful
linear telos that will rescue my evolutionary origin from pure contingency
and apparent meaninglessness, I can find instead what I would call a vertical
or depth teleology. For it is by perceiving my groundedness in God as
the eternal depth of being, the negation of the negation of being, that I can
affirm my being in spite of the radical contingency of my evolutionary
origin. What is more, to the extent that nature participates analogically in
human being, this courageous self-affirmation of being, this redemption
from the threat of nonbeing, is a redemption in which the process of biological
evolution participates.
What, more exactly, might be involved in my perceiving my groundedness
in God as the eternal depth of being?4 Two brief examples will need to
suffice here. To recognize that my existence is given, that it is “let be,” by
being-itself, despite the constant threat of nonbeing, is to be struck by
religious wonder at the fact that, in the famous Leibnitzian formula, there
is anything at all rather than simply nothing.5 This self-conscious wonder
and religious gratitude for the sheer fact of being is, of course, firmly tied
up with wonder and gratitude at my own particular chance to participate
in being, and I am now fully cognizant of how all the more gratuitous is
the fact of my existence given the incredible contingency and tenuousness
of the process of evolution that has produced me. By gratefully recognizRichard
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ing my being as supported or grounded in God as the depth of being, as
the negation of the negation of being, I am able to powerfully affirm my
being in spite of the threat of nonbeing, to live in a way that Tillich would
identify with courage and with faith (see Tillich 1952). And given the tie
between my own being and the evolutionary process, this faith is, on an
analogical level, a courageous affirmation too of the process of evolution—
a faith in its redemption, as it were.
Consider a second example. Tillich’s phenomenological derivation of
the structure of human being uncovers the basic polar structure of freedom
and destiny, individuation and participation, and dynamics and form.
He intends this polar structure to be understood in such a way that the
more fully realized the destiny pole, the more fully realized the pole of
freedom. The poles, in other words, are in the most creative, the healthiest,
of tensions. In our fallen condition, however, the poles tend to come

apart, so that freedom degenerates into mere arbitrariness and destiny into
mechanical necessity. The particularly Christian form of thinking myself
in relation to God—of orienting my sense of self by God, if you will—
opens up the possibility of New Being in Christ, that particular Christ
given to us in what Tillich calls the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ.
That picture offers the possibility of reestablishing the proper polar tension
between the elements of our being.
Consider how the idea of Darwinian evolution might provide concrete
resources in this redemptive process effected through faith in the Christ.
Rather than finding my freedom degenerating into mere arbitrariness, I
can understand it as situated within the larger boundary-setting destiny of
evolutionary history; my individuation finds its proper context in my solidarity
with the whole history of evolution and its many species, of which I
am a part; and the danger of being stuck in unchanging, ultimately lifeless
form is overcome by the fact of evolutionary change, to which I am inextricably
bound via the history of my species. Both my own being and the
Darwinian notion of evolution are “redeemed” here, once again, not by
engaging in some metaphysical argument about how evolution can be
understood in relation to divine causality and teleology within history but
rather with how evolution is taken up into my own redemptive quest, in
how I understand myself in relation to God as being-itself, in this case
being-itself as manifested in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.
The argument that depth teleology rather than any sort of linear teleology
ought to be at issue when thinking about evolution can be reinforced
by recalling that biologists refuse even the vaguest hint of teleology in the
evolutionary process and also by recalling what Tillich has to say about
history. For the temporal unfolding that is history and the temporal unfolding
that is evolution are surely related, even though, in the technical
sense given it by Tillich, history, properly speaking, arises only in those
dimensions of being where “spirit” is present. Those who have read the
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third volume of Tillich’s Systematic Theology may remember that, according
to Tillich, the end of history, in the sense of the meaning that both
fulfills and judges it, is not some Omega Point, not some temporal end,
but rather what Tillich terms “eternal life.” That is, we once again must
look to a depth teleology, an eternal now.
The distinction between approaching Darwinian evolution via a
Tillichian depth teleology and via any variety of historical, linear teleology
is significant, I think. Haught’s desire to find some form of linear teleology,
however highly modified, means that, unfortunately, his theology cannot
pass muster with genuine Darwinian theory. And this is so whether or
not one reads Darwin through the lens of a thoroughly materialistic
metaphysic: whatever metaphysic one attempts to link to Darwinian science,
Darwin refuses all teleology. Frederick Crews, whose critical intelligence
has done much to oppose Freudian theory, turns his considerable
abilities to a defense of Darwin. Crews calls Haught’s position into question
with the observation that Haught
relocates God in the future and depicts him not as a planner but as “a transcendent
force of attraction.” But it doesn’t occur to Haught that such teleology is just what
Darwin managed to subtract from science. Whether pushing us or pulling us
toward his desired end, the Christian God is utterly extraneous to evolution as

Darwin and his modern successors have understood it. Evolution is an undirected,
reactive process—the exact opposite of Haught’s construal—or nothing at
all. (Crews 2001, 52)

The Tillichian approach that I have suggested here embraces the truth
that the Christian God is utterly extraneous to evolution, that is, to evolution
in and of itself, evolution as a physical process. It is the meaning and
value of evolution and its connection to our religious projects that get
connected with the Tillichian God. Depth teleology means that the larger
reality of nature and its struggles, whatever the accidental ends of those
struggles within history, become meaningful by being juxtaposed to Tillich’s
version of the Christian vision of the meaning and purpose of human existence—
human existence as it essentially ought to be, that is, as it is
grounded in God. All of physical nature participates, as we have seen,
analogically in this depth goal of human being; and, in turn, the human
quest for redemption is enriched and much more adequately understood
when located within its physical, including evolutionary, environment.
Subsequent to his book God After Darwin Haught published an article
titled “In Search of a God for Evolution: Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard
de Chardin” (Haught 2002). Not surprisingly, given his emphasis on a
God of the future who lures the evolutionary process forward, Haught’s
article praises Teilhard’s future-oriented metaphysic and its notion of the
Omega Point. But what does he have to say about Tillich, and what light
do his remarks shed upon my own Tillichian proposal? In order to see why
Haught discounts Tillich as a viable resource for thinking about evolution,
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we can start with one of his central observations about Teilhard: “As his
thought matured, Teilhard increasingly complained that traditional theology,
insofar as it focused on esse (the idea of being), is unable as such to
contextualize the dramatic new sense of a world still in the process of becoming”
(Haught 2002, 542). While Haught appreciates Tillich’s notion
of “New Being,” he finds that Tillich’s underlying metaphysic or ontology
is still one of esse. Being-itself is the primordial Ground of Being, the
essential origin to which fallen being must be restored, rather than a force
calling fallen being into the future: “In Tillich, the futurity of being is still
subordinated to the idea of an eternal presence of being” (2002, 549).
If one’s strategy for coming up with a theology for evolution is to link
scientific reason with metaphysics, Haught may well be right that a metaphysics
of God as future holds more promise than a metaphysics of esse.
First of all, however, I have tried to show that, whatever its strengths,
Haught’s metaphysics of the future cannot escape the violation of the law
of the conservation of energy. Second, the central move in my interpretation
of Tillich is not a matter of linking his metaphysics or ontology of esse
with scientific reason (though of course I make use of his notion of beingitself,
or the Ground of Being). Rather, I have taken a wholly different
approach: I have linked evolutionary theory with Tillich’s ecstatic reason,
with the whole phenomenon of our ultimate concern. This approach, I
argue, provides a powerful resource for the religious person to take Darwinian
evolutionary thinking up into his or her religious life and thinking.
By way of conclusion, it is perhaps my duty to make sure that the theological
books are balanced. Just as there is a law of conservation of energy
that dictates that, in the physical universe, one cannot get something for

nothing, so there is a kind of law of conservation of theological value that
applies to any theological proposal. While the Tillichian approach that I
am proposing here does offer (at least in my opinion) a genuinely workable
combination of science and religion, one that avoids violating scientific
principles and yet meaningfully enriches our notion of ultimate
concern, we of course lose something when it comes to our notion of the
divine. Tillich’s God can provide a depth teleology that creates no interference
with the law of conservation of energy or with biology’s total rejection
of linear teleology only insofar as his God is essentially irrelevant to
the actual physical workings of that universe, however much that God
may have significant implications for how we consider the value of the
universe and its relation to our own religious quest. By contrast, Haught’s
proposal, while it has what I have argued are some not-insignificant technical
difficulties, has the laudable characteristic of proposing—and proposing
in elegant fashion—a God who, through how he introduces novelty
into the universe and lures the universe, still has a vital relation to that
universe and actually affects its physical unfolding. At the end of the day,
in both my Tillichian proposal about science and religion and in Haught’s
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approach, there is always a tradeoff; something is gained and something is
lost. In theologizing, as in much of life, one must pay one’s money and
take one’s choice.
NOTES
1. Some readers are already familiar with Ian Barbour’s four categories—conflict, independence,
dialogue, and integration (Barbour 1990). When Haught analyzes theological responses to
evolution in particular, he finds it convenient to group the responses into three categories: opposition,
separatism, and engagement.
2. Even though the notion of redemption applies, most technically, only to this fallen or
“existential” state of being, I take the liberty of using the term redemption at various points in this
essay in a more general sense as any process in which being is rescued from the threat of nonbeing.
3. Dutch journalist Wim Kayzer filmed a series of interviews with various scientists and philosophers.
It was in one of these conversations that Gould used the phrase “glorious accident.”
The film conversations were subsequently published by Kayzer as a book (1997).
4. It should be noted that my considering my existence as grounded in being-itself has the
singular advantage of avoiding any violation of the law of conservation of energy. That is, this is
not a matter of God acting from without the closed system of nature. Rather, as long as it is
simply my own thinking that is at issue—even if that thinking is about God and perhaps even
entails my being grasped by an ultimate concern and is therefore “ecstatic” thinking or reason—
that thinking is still purely natural and can be explained in terms of the energy that is already part
of the biological system of which my thinking is a part (assuming, as I am, that thinking is simply
a particular dynamic of electrical and chemical processes in brain tissue).
5. See Tillich’s discussion of the “ontological shock” in Systematic Theology 1:113, 163.
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